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On a Rank-Metric Code-Based Cryptosystem with
Small Key Size
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Abstract—A repair of the Faure–Loidreau (FL) public-key
code-based cryptosystem is proposed. The FL cryptosystem is
based on the hardness of list decoding Gabidulin codes which
are special rank-metric codes. We prove that the recent structural
attack on the system by Gaborit et al. is equivalent to decoding
an interleaved Gabidulin code. Since all known polynomial-time
decoders for these codes fail for a large constructive class of
error patterns, we are able to construct public keys that resist
the attack. It is also shown that all other known attacks fail for
our repair and parameter choices. Compared to other code-based
cryptosystems, we obtain significantly smaller key sizes for the
same security level.
Index Terms—code-based cryptography, rank-metric codes,
interleaving, Gabidulin codes
I. INTRODUCTION
Public-key cryptography is the foundation for establishing
secure communication between multiple parties. Traditional
public-key algorithms such as RSA are based on the hardness
of factoring large numbers or the discrete logarithm problem,
but can be attacked in polynomial time once a capable quan-
tum computer exists. Code-based public-key cryptosystems are
considered to be post-quantum secure, but compared to RSA
their main drawback are significantly larger key sizes.
The Faure–Loidreau (FL) code-based cryptosystem [2], [3]
is based on the problem of reconstructing linearized poly-
nomials and can be seen as linearized equivalent of the
(broken) Augot–Finiasz cryptosystem [4]. While the Augot–
Finiasz cryptosystem is closely connected to (list) decoding
Reed–Solomon codes, the FL cryptosystem is connected to
(list) decoding Gabidulin codes, a special class of rank-metric
codes [5].
The main drawback of code-based cryptography compared
to systems based on the factorization (e.g., RSA) or the
discrete logarithm problem (e.g., the Diffie–Hellman key
exchange) are large key sizes. In contrast to McEliece or
Niederreiter-type cryptosystems, where the public key is a
matrix, in the FL system, the key is only a vector, resulting in a
much smaller key. At the time when the FL cryptosystem was
designed, it was only conjectured that Gabidulin codes cannot
J. Renner, S. Puchinger, and A. Wachter-Zeh are with the Institute for Com-
munications Engineering, Technical University of Munich (TUM), Germany,
e-mail: {julian.renner, sven.puchinger, antonia.wachter-zeh}@tum.de.
This paper was presented in part at the IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory, 2018 [1]. J. Renner’s and A. Wachter-Zeh’s work was
supported by the TUM—Institute for Advanced Study, funded by the German
Excellence Initiative and European Union Seventh Framework Programme
under Grant Agreement No. 291763. This work was partly done while
S. Puchinger was with Ulm University.
be list decoded efficiently. As this was proven recently for
many families of Gabidulin codes [6], [7], the FL system is a
very promising post-quantum secure public-key cryptosystem.
However, there are attacks on the FL cryptosystem: syn-
drome decoding [8], an Overbeck-like attack [9] which can be
avoided by choosing the parameters in a certain way (cf. [3])
and, more severe, the recent attack by Gaborit, Otmani and
Talé Kalachi [10] which leaves no secure set of parameters of
the system.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly,
a new coding-theoretic interpretation of the FL system is given
and an alternative decryption algorithm is proposed. Secondly,
it is shown that the public key can be seen as corrupted
codeword of an interleaved Gabidulin code. Further, it is
proven that the failure condition of the attack by Gaborit et
al. [10] on the public key is equivalent to the failure condition
of decoding the public key as an interleaved Gabidulin code
to obtain the private key. Thirdly, a repair of the FL system
is proposed. By choosing the public key in a way that the
corresponding interleaved decoder is guaranteed to fail, the
system is secured against the attack in [10]. We also prove
that the repaired system resists all other known attacks.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section II, the
notation is introduced and definitions are given. In Section III,
the original FL system is shown and its complexity is analyzed.
A new interpretation of the ciphertext and the public key is
shown in Section IV. In Section V, the attack by Gaborit et
al. [10] is recalled and its equivalence to decoding the public
key as an interleaved Gabidulin is proven. Based on this proof,
a repair of the system is proposed in Section VI and a security
analysis of the repair is given in Section VII. In Section VIII,
example parameters for security levels of 80, 128, 256 bit
are proposed and compared to those of McEliece-like systems
based on Goppa codes, Gabidulin codes, QC-MDPC codes
and DC-LRPC codes. Conclusions are given in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Let q be a power of a prime and let Fq denote the finite
field of order q and Fqm its extension field of order q
m. We
use Fm×nq to denote the set of all m × n matrices over Fq
and Fnqm = F
1×n
qm for the set of all row vectors of length n
over Fqm . Further, we use another field extension Fqmu with
u > 1. Thus, Fq ⊆ Fqm ⊆ Fqmu .
For a field F, the vector space that is spanned by
v1, . . . ,vl ∈ F
n is denoted by
〈v1, . . . ,vl〉F =
{
l∑
i=1
aivi : ai ∈ F
}
.
Denote the set of integers [a, b] = {i : a ≤ i ≤ b}. Rows
and columns of m× n-matrices are indexed by 1, . . . ,m and
1, . . . , n, where Ai,j is the element in the i-th row and j-th
column of the matrix A. Further,
A[a,b] :=

A1,a . . . A1,b... . . . ...
Am,a . . . Am,b

 .
By rankq(A) and rankqm(A), we denote the rank of a
matrix A over Fq , respectively Fqm . Let (γ1, γ2, . . . , γu) be
an ordered basis of Fqmu over Fqm . By utilizing the vector
space isomorphism Fqmu ∼= F
u
qm , we can relate each vector
a ∈ Fnqmu to a matrix A ∈ F
u×n
qm according to
extγ : F
n
qm → F
m×n
q
a = (a1, . . . , an) 7→ A =

A1,1 . . . A1,n... . . . ...
Am,1 . . . Am,n

 ,
where γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γu) and
aj =
m∑
i=1
Ai,jγi, ∀j ∈ [1, n].
The trace operator of a vector a ∈ Fqm to Fq is defined by
Trqm/q : F
n
qm → F
n
q
a = (a1, . . . , an) 7→
(
m−1∑
i=0
a
qi
1 , . . . ,
m−1∑
i=0
aq
i
n
)
.
A dual basis (γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 , . . . , γ
∗
u) to (γ1, γ2, . . . , γu) is a basis
that fulfills
Trqmu/qm(γiγ
∗
j ) =
{
1 if i = j
0 else
,
where i, j ∈ [1, u]. Note that a dual basis always exists.
Denote by Ms,q (a) ∈ F
s×n
qm the s× n Moore matrix for a
vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ F
n
qm , i.e.,
Ms,q (a) =


a1 a2 . . . an
a
q
1 a
q
2 . . . a
q
n
...
...
. . .
...
a
qs−1
1 a
qs−1
2 . . . a
qs−1
n

 .
If a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ Fqm are linearly independent over Fq, then
rankqm(Ms,q (a)) = min{s, n}, cf. [11, Lemma 3.15]. This
definition can also be extended to matrices by
Ms,q (A) =


A1,1 A1,2 . . . A1,n
A2,1 A2,2 . . . A2,n
...
...
. . .
...
Al,1 Al,2 . . . Al,n
A
q
1,1 A
q
1,2 . . . A
q
1,n
A
q
2,1 A
q
2,2 . . . A
q
2,n
...
...
. . .
...
A
qs−1
l,1 A
qs−1
l,2 . . . A
qs−1
l,n


,
where A ∈ Fl×nqm .
The Gaussian binomial coefficients are denoted by[s
r
]
q
:=
{
(1−qs)(1−qs−1)...(1−qs−r+1)
(1−q)(1−q2)...(1−qr) for r ≤ s
0 for r > s,
where s and r are non-negative integers.
B. Rank-Metric Codes and Gabidulin Codes
The rank norm rankq(a) is the rank of the matrix represen-
tation A ∈ Fm×nq over Fq . The rank distance between a and b
is the rank of the difference of the two matrix representations,
i.e.,
dR(a,b) := rankq(a− b) = rankq(A−B).
An [n, k, d]Rq code C over Fqm is a linear rank-metric code, i.e.,
it is a linear subspace of Fnqm of dimension k and minimum
rank distance
d := min
a,b∈C
a 6=b
{
dR(a,b) = rankq(a− b)
}
.
For linear codes with n ≤ m, the Singleton-like upper bound
[5], [12] implies that d ≤ n − k + 1. If d = n − k + 1, the
code is called a maximum rank distance (MRD) code.
Gabidulin codes [5] are a special class of rank-metric codes
and can be defined by their generator matrices.
Definition 1 (Gabidulin Code [5]) A linear G(n, k) code
over Fqm of length n ≤ m and dimension k is defined by
its k × n generator matrix
GG =Mk,q (g1, g2, . . . , gn) ,
where g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) ∈ F
n
qm and rankq(g) = n.
In [5], it is shown that Gabidulin codes are MRD codes, i.e.,
d = n− k + 1.
For a short description on decoding of Gabidulin codes,
denote by CG ∈ F
m×n
q the transmitted codeword (i.e., the
matrix representation of cG ∈ F
n
qm) of a G(n, k) code that is
corrupted by an additive error E ∈ Fm×nq . At the receiver side,
only the received matrix R ∈ Fm×nq , where R = CG +E, is
known. The channel might provide additional side information
in the form of erasures:
• ̺ row erasures (in [13] called "deviations") and
• γ column erasures (in [13] called "erasures"),
such that the received matrix can be decomposed into
R = CG +A
(R)B(R) +A(C)B(C) +E︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Etotal
, (1)
where A(R) ∈ Fm×̺q , B
(R) ∈ F̺×nq , A
(C) ∈ Fm×γq , B
(C) ∈
F
γ×n
q are full-rank matrices, respectively, and E
(E) ∈ Fm×nq
is a matrix of rank t. The decoder knows R and additionally
A(R) and B(C). Further, t denotes the number of errors with-
out side information. The rank-metric error-erasure decoding
algorithms from [13]–[15] can then reconstruct cG ∈ G(n, k)
with asymptotic complexity O(n2) operations over Fqm , or in
sub-quadratic complexity using the fast operations described
in [16], [17], if
2t+ ̺+ γ ≤ d− 1 = n− k (2)
is fulfilled.
C. Decoding Rank Errors Beyond Half the Minimum Distance
Interleaved Gabidulin Codes are a code class for which
efficient decoders are known that are able to correct errors
or rank larger than ⌊d−12 ⌋.
Definition 2 (Interleaved Gabidulin Codes [18]) A linear
(vertically, homogeneous) interleaved Gabidulin code
IG(u;n, k) over Fqm of length n ≤ m, dimension k ≤ n,
and interleaving order u is defined by
IG(u;n, k) :=




c
(1)
G
c
(2)
G
...
c
(u)
G

 : c(i)G ∈ G(n, k), ∀i ∈ [1, u]


.
When considering random errors of rank weight t, the code
IG(u;n, k) can be decoded uniquely with high probability up
to t ≤ ⌊ uu+1 (n − k)⌋ errors
1, cf. [15], [18], [19]. However,
it is well-known that there are many error patterns for which
the known efficient decoders fail. In fact, we can explicitly
construct a large class of such errors, see Lemma 6 in
Section V-B.
III. THE ORIGINAL FAURE–LOIDREAU SYSTEM
In this section, the algorithms of the original FL cryp-
tosystem are recalled and the main assumption on which the
security of the system is based are explained.
A. Parameters
Let q,m, n, k, u, w, tpub be positive integers that fulfill the
restrictions given in Table I. In the following, we consider
the three finite fields Fq, Fqm , and Fqmu , which are extension
fields of each other, respectively:
Fq ⊆ Fqm ⊆ Fqmu .
1In this setting, an error of weight t is a u× n matrix of Fq-rank t. Note
that this means that the tall (um) × n-matrix obtained by expanding the
matrix component-wise over Fq has rank t.
B. Key Generation
The original FL key generation is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Key Generation
Input: Parameters q,m, n, k, u, w as in Table I
Output: Private key (x,P), public key (g, k,kpub, tpub)
1 Choose g ∈ Fnqm at random with rankq(g) = n
2 Choose x ∈ Fkqmu at random such that {xk−u+1, . . . , xk}
forms a basis of Fqmu over Fqm
3 Choose s ∈ Fwqmu with rankq(s) = w
4 Choose an invertible matrix P ∈ Fn×nq at random
5 GG ←Mk,q (g)
6 z← (s | 0) ·P−1
7 kpub ← x ·GG + z
8 tpub ←
⌊
n−w−k
2
⌋
9 return (x,P), (g, k,kpub, tpub)
C. Encryption
The encryption scheme is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Encryption
Input: Plaintext m = (m1, . . . ,mk−u, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ F
k
qm , public
key (g, k,kpub, tpub)
Output: Ciphertext c
1 Choose α ∈ Fqmu \ {0} at random
2 Choose e ∈ Fnqm such that rankq(e) = tpub at random
3 GG ←Mk,q (g)
4 return c←m ·GG + Trqmu/qm(αkpub) + e.
D. Decryption
The decryption method is shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Decryption
Input: Ciphertext c, private key (x,P)
Output: Plaintext m
1 c′ ← cP[w+1,n]
2 G′ ← Gabidulin code generated by GGP[w+1,n]
3 m′ ← decode c′ in G′
4 α←
∑k
i=k−u+1m
′
ix
∗
i
5 return m←m′ − Trqmu/qm(αx)
Theorem 1 (Correctness [2]) Algorithm 3 returns the cor-
rect plaintext m.
Proof: Line 1 computes
cP = (m+Trqmu/qm(αx))GGP+(Trqmu/qm(αs)|0) + eP,
whose last n− w columns are given by
c′ = (m +Trqmu/qm(αx))G
′ + e′,
where G′ := GGP[w+1,n] ∈ F
k×(n−w)
qm and e
′ := eP[w+1,n].
By decoding in G′, we thus obtain the vector
m′ = m+Trqmu/qm(αx).
Since the last u positions of the plaintext m are zero (i.e.,
mi = 0 for i = k−u+1, . . . , k), we get α =
∑k
i=k−u+1 m
′
ix
∗
i ,
where {x∗k−u+1, . . . , x
∗
k} is a dual basis to {xk−u+1, . . . , xk}.
Table I
SUMMARY OF THE PARAMETERS
Name Use Restriction
q small field size prime power
m extension degree 1 ≤ m
n code length n ≤ m
k code dimension k < n
u extension degree 2 ≤ u < k
w error weight in public key max
{
n− k − k−u
u−1
,
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
+ 1
}
≤ w < u
u+2
(n− k)
tpub error weight in ciphertext tpub =
⌊
n−k−w
2
⌋
The latter observation is technical to prove. As we know α and
x, we can therefore compute the plaintext m.
E. Complexity
It is essential for a cryptosystem that key generation, encryp-
tion, and decryption can be implemented fast. The following
results were not known when the original FL system was
proposed, but have a major impact on its efficiency.
The complexity of key generation and encryption is domi-
nated by the cost of encoding in a Gabidulin code (Line 7 of
Algorithm 1 and Line 4 of Algorithm 2).2 The asymptotically
fastest-known algorithms [16], [17] for this require
• O∼(nmin{
θ+1
2 ,1.635}) operations in Fqm in general and
• O∼(n) operations in Fqm if the entries of g form a normal
basis of Fqm over Fq ,
where θ is the matrix multiplication exponent and O∼ means
that log factors are neglected.
The bottleneck of decryption is (error-erasure-) decoding in
a Gabidulin code (Line 3 of Algorithm 3, see also Section IV-A
below), where the asymptotically fastest algorithm costs
O∼
(
nmin{
θ+1
2 ,1.635}
)
operations in Fqm [16], [17].
For small lengths n, the algorithms in [20]–[22], which have
quadratic complexity over Fqm (or cubic complexity over Fq),
might be faster than the mentioned algorithms due to smaller
hidden constants in the O-notation.
F. Assumption of the FL System
The security of the system is based on the assumption that
it is computationally infeasible to retrieve any part of the
private key (x,P) given the public key and the ciphertext.
As soon as the attacker knows one part of it, he is able to find
an alternative private key efficiently. E.g., if the vector x is
known, one can compute z = kpub − xGG and an invertible
matrix Pˆ ∈ Fn×nq such that zPˆ = (sˆ | 0). Then, the attacker
simply applies the decryption algorithm using (x, Pˆ) as private
key to retrieve the plaintext from the ciphertext.
2Note that since x and z have coefficients in the large field Fqmu , this line
can be realized as encoding and corruption of u messages over Fqm with the
generator matrix GG ∈ F
k×n
qm (see also Section IV-B below).
IV. CODING-THEORETIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
ORIGINAL FAURE–LOIDREAU SYSTEM
We present two coding-theoretic interpretations of
the Faure–Loidreau system, which—to the best of our
knowledge—have not been observed before.
A. Decryption as Error-Erasure Decoding
Lemma 2 Fix a basis γ of Fqm over Fq . Then, the matrix
representation of the ciphertext can be written in the form
extγ(c) = CG +A
(C)B(C) +E, (3)
where
CG = extγ([m+Trqmu/qm(αx)] ·GG) ∈ F
m×n
q
is unknown and a codeword of a Gabidulin code,
A(C) = extγ(Trqmu/qm(αs)) ∈ F
m×w
q
is unknown,
B(C) = (P−1)[1,...,w] ∈ F
w×n
q
is known and
E = extγ(e) ∈ F
m×n
q
is unknown.
Proof: Due to the Fqm -linearity of the trace map
Trqmu/qm and the fact that the entries of the matrices GG
and P−1 are in Fqm , we can write the ciphertext as follows.
c = mGG + Trqmu/qm(αkpub) + e
= mGG + Trqmu/qm(αxGG + αz) + e
=
[
m+ Trqmu/qm (αx)
]
GG +Trqmu/qm(αz) + e
=
[
m+ Trqmu/qm (αx)
]
GG +Trqmu/qm(α(s | 0)P
−1) + e
=
[
m+ Trqmu/qm (αx)
]
GG +Trqmu/qm(αs(P
−1)[1,w]) + e
=
[
m+ Trqmu/qm (αx)
]
GG +Trqmu/qm(αs)(P
−1)[1,w] + e.
Since the entries of (P−1)[1,...,w] are in Fq, the expansion of
the ciphertext into the Fq-basis γ of Fqm can be written as
in (3) above.
Theorem 3 The message vector m can be reconstructed by
the error-erasure decoders in [13]–[15] (as well as their
speed-up in [16], [17]) and Steps 4 and 5 of Algorithm 3.
Proof: As seen in Lemma 2, we can decompose the
matrix representation of the ciphertext into a codeword plus
an error that is partially known. In fact, the decomposition is
of the form as in (1) (see Section II-B), so m+Trqmu/qm(αx)
can be reconstructed by the error-erasure decoders in [13]–[15]
since the decoding condition (2) reads as
w + 2 rankq(E) = w + 2tpub ≤ n− k
in this case and is fulfilled by Table I.
The message m can then be recovered from m +
Trqmu/qm(αx) using the same steps as in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 3 leads to the following observation. The cipher-
text is a codeword plus an error of rank weight w+tpub, which
is beyond the unique decoding radius. The legitimate receiver
can only decrypt since she knows the (w-dimensional) row
space of a part of the error. Although the attacker knows the
code, she cannot recover the message since she has no further
knowledge about the structure of the error. Note the difference
to the code-based McEliece cryptosystem, where the security
relies on the fact that an attacker does not know the structure
of the code. We will turn this observation into an exponential-
time message attack in Section VII-C, which we will consider
in our parameter choice.
Furthermore, the procedure implied by Theorem 3 might
have a practical advantage compared to the original decryption
algorithm. The code G′ used for decoding in Algorithm 3
depends on the private key. In Theorem 3, the code is given
by g, which is public and in fact does not need to be chosen
randomly in the key generation.3 Depending on the used
algorithm and type of implementation (e.g., in hardware), it
can be advantageous in terms of complexity or implementation
size if the code is fixed.
B. Public Key as Corrupted Interleaved Codeword
Our second observation is that the public key kpub of
the cryptosystem is a corrupted codeword of an interleaved
Gabidulin code. To our knowledge, this connection between
the public key and interleaved Gabidulin codes has not been
known before. This interpretation is central to this paper and
will be used in Section V-B to derive a modification of the
public key that is not vulnerable against the attacks described
in Section V.
Theorem 4 Fix a basis γ of Fqmu over Fqm . Let γ
∗ be a dual
basis to γ and write kpub =
∑u
i=1 k
(i)
pubγ
∗
i . Then,

k
(1)
pub
k
(2)
pub
...
k
(u)
pub

 =


c
(1)
G
c
(2)
G
...
c
(u)
G

+


z1
z2
...
zu

 , (4)
3Note that we described the key generation as in [2], where g is chosen at
random, but this is not necessary for the security of the system.
where the c
(i)
G ∈ F
n
qm are codewords of the Gabidulin code
G(n, k) with generator matrix GG and the zi ∈ F
n
qm are
obtained from the vector z ∈ Fnqmu by z =
∑u
i=1 ziγ
∗
i .
Proof: Recall the definition of the public key
kpub = x ·GG + z,
where x ∈ Fkqmu , GG ∈ F
k×n
qm is the generator matrix of a
G(n, k) code, and z ∈ Fnqmu with rankq(z) = w. Let x =∑u
i=1 xiγ
∗
i , where the xi have coefficients in Fqm .
Then, we obtain the following representation of the public
key kpub as a u× n matrix in Fqm

k
(1)
pub
k
(2)
pub
...
k
(u)
pub

 =


x1
x2
...
xu

·GG +


z1
z2
...
zu

 =


x1 ·GG
x2 ·GG
...
xu ·GG

+


z1
z2
...
zu

 .
Since xi ·GG is a codeword of a G(n, k) code, ∀i ∈ [1, u],
the matrix representation of kpub can be seen as a codeword
from an IG(u;n, k) code, corrupted by an error.
Note that the error (z⊤1 , . . . , z
⊤
u )
⊤ in (4) has Fq-rank at most
w due to the structure of z = (s | 0)P−1.
V. EFFICIENT STRUCTURAL ATTACKS
Among all known attacks on the original FL cryptosystem,
there are only two that are considered to be efficient. These
two structural attacks on the original FL system provide an
alternative private key in polynomial time and are shown in
this section. The first one was proposed by Gaborit, Otmani
and Talé Kalachi in [10], whereas the second is new and is
derived. Further, it is proven that the failure conditions of both
attacks are equivalent.
A. GOT Attack
The attack shown in Algorithm 4 was proposed by Gaborit,
Otmani, and Talé Kalachi in [10, Algo. 1]. It determines an
(alternative) private key that can be used in Algorithm 3 and
it is herein referred to as GOT Attack.
Algorithm 4: GOT Attack
Input: Public key (g, k,kpub, tpub)
Output: Private key (x,P)
1 Choose γ1, . . . , γu to be a basis of Fqmu over Fqm
2 k
(i)
pub ← Trqmu/qm(γikpub) for all i = 1, . . . , u
3 GG ←Mk,q (g)
4 Pick at random a non-zero vector h˜ ∈ Fnqm such that
Mn−w−k,q




GG
k
(1)
pub
...
k
(u)
pub



 h˜T = 0.
5 Choose P ∈ Fn×nq and h
′ ∈ Fn−wqm such that
h˜
(
P−1
)T
= ( 0 | h′)
6 Choose x such that xGGP
′ = kpubP
′, where
P′ = P[w+1,n] ∈ F
n×(n−w)
q
7 return (x,P)
The key recovery shown in Algorithm 4 on the FL system
succeeds under the conditions of the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (GOT Attack [10, Thm. 1]) Let γ1, . . . , γu ∈
Fqmu be a basis of Fqmu over Fqm and let zi =
Trqmu/qm(γiz), for i = 1, . . . u.
If the matrix Z ∈ Fu×nqm with z1, . . . , zu as rows, satisfies
rankqm(Mn−k−w,q (Z)) = w,
then (x, z) can be recovered from GG ,kpub with O(n
3)
operations in Fqmu .
If the key is generated as described in Section III-B, the
GOT attack breaks the FL system with high probability.
B. Interleaved Decoding Attack
The second attack is based on the observation in Sec-
tion IV-B that the public key kpub is a corrupted interleaved
codeword. We will refer to it in the following as Interleaved
Decoding attack. The idea is to decode kpub in an interleaved
Gabidulin code. Since w ≤ uu+1 (n− k), such a decoder will
return x with high probability, but fail in certain cases.
Lemma 6 (Interleaved Decoding [18], [19], [22, p. 64])
Let ci = xi ·GG . All known
4 efficient decoders for IG(u;n, k)
codes fail to correct an error z ∈ Fnqmu with z =
∑u
i=1 ziγ
∗
i
and rankq(z) = w if
rankqm


Mn−w−1,q (g)
Mn−k−w,q (c1 + z1)
Mn−k−w,q (c2 + z2)
...
Mn−k−w,q (cu + zu)

 < n− 1.
Since rankqm(Mn−w−1,q (g)) = n − w − 1, the interleaved
decoder fails if
rankqm
(
Z˜
)
:= ϕ < w, (5)
where
Z˜ =


Mn−k−w,q (z1)
Mn−k−w,q (z2)
...
Mn−k−w,q (zu)

 . (6)
C. Equivalence of GOT Attack’s and Interleaved Decoding
Attack’s Failure Conditions
In the following theorem, we prove that the failure condition
of the GOT Attack is equivalent to the condition that decoding
kpub in an interleaved Gabidulin code fails.
Theorem 7 The GOT Attack from [10] fails if and only if
the Interleaved Decoding Attack from Section V-B fails. In
particular, it fails if (5) holds.
4i.e., the algorithms in [18], [19], and [22, p. 64].
Proof: Rewrite the matrix from Theorem 5 as
Mn−w−k,q (Z) =


z1
...
zu
z
q
1
...
zqu
...
z
qn−w−k−1
1
...
zq
n−w−k−1
u


(7)
and the matrix from equation (6) as
Z˜ =


z1
...
z
qn−w−k−1
1
z2
...
z
qn−w−k−1
2
...
zu
...
zq
n−w−k−1
u


. (8)
Since the matrix in (7) and in (8) only differ in row permuta-
tions, they are row-space equivalent, implying that they have
the same rank. Further, the rank of the matrix in (8) cannot
become larger than w (since any vector in the right kernel
of this matrix has rank weight at least n− w [23, Algorithm
3.2.1]). Thus, the failures of Theorem 5 and Lemma 6 are
equivalent.
VI. REPARATION OF THE FL SYSTEM
To repair the FL system, we introduce a new key generation
algorithm that is based on choosing z =
∑u
i=1 ziγ
∗
i in a way
that ϕ < w. In this case, an interleaved decoder, see (5), and
therefore also the GOT attack [10] fail, see Theorem 7.
Theorem 8 Let dim(〈z1, . . . , zu〉Fqm ) = ζ. Then
ϕ ≤ min{ζ(n− k − w), w}. (9)
Proof: The dimension of 〈z1, . . . , zu〉Fqm implies that at
most ζ(n − k − w) rows of Z˜ are linearly independent over
Fqm , meaning that ϕ ≤ ζ(n− k − w).
The definition of z = (s | 0) ·P−1 leads to
ϕ = rankqm(Z˜)
= rankqm



 Mn−k−w,q (s1) 0... ...
Mn−k−w,q (su) 0

P−1


= rankqm

 Mn−k−w,q (s1)...
Mn−k−w,q (su)


≤ w,
where the last inequality holds since s1, . . . , su are vectors of
length w.
We therefore propose the following modification to Line 3
of the Key Generation.
3 Choose ζ < wn−k−w and generate s1, . . . , su ∈ F
w
qm
at random such that dim(〈s1, . . . , su〉Fqm ) = ζ and
rankq
(∑u
i=1 siγ
∗
i
)
= w. Compute s =
∑u
i=1 siγ
∗
i .
Clearly, we restrict the choice of z in Line 3 of the Key
Generation algorithm but we will see that there are still enough
possibilities for z to preserve a high security level.
A SageMath v8.4 [24] implementation of the FL system
including the proposed repair can be downloaded from https:
//bitbucket.org/julianrenner/repaired_fl. It should be noted that
the purpose of the source code is to clarify the shown
algorithms but not to provide a secure and efficient imple-
mentation.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE REPAIR
In this section, we summarize the most efficient attacks
on the FL system and we show that the restriction on z
from (6) does not pose a problem in terms of the security
level. Furthermore, we show that choosing ζ = 1 provides the
largest security level.
A. Brute-Force the Vector z Attack
As shown in Section III-F, knowing z is sufficient to be
able to decrypt the ciphertext. Thus, one possible attack is to
try all possible choices of z. We count the number of such
choices using the following result. In [23, Lemma 3.13], the
number of a× b matrices of rank c over Fq is given by
Ma,b,c :=
c−1∏
i=0
(qa − qi)(qb − qi)
qc − qi
.
Together with the constructive argument in [25, Section IV.B],
we obtain the following bounds on Ma,b,c:
qc(a+b−c−1) ≤Ma,b,c ≤ γc · q
c(a+b−c), (10)
where γc :=
∏c−1
i=0
1
1−qi−c ≤ 0.288
−1 ≤ 3.48.
In the general case ζ < wn−k−w , the number of Moore
matrices as in (6) and such that rankq(z) = w is given from
the failure probability of an interleaved Gabidulin decoder,
cf. [19]. The number of such matrices therefore equals
|{z ∈ Fnqmu : rankq(z) = w}| · Pf ≥ q
w(mu+n−w−1) · Pf ,
where the inequality is due to (10). However, a lower bound on
the failure probability is not known. As an approximation, we
can use Pf ≈ q
−m and therefore the number of such matrices
is at least qw(mu+n−w−1)−m.
The number of vectors s1 ∈ F
w
qm with rankq(s1) = w is at
least qw(m+n−w−1) by (10). Thus, for ζ = 1, the number of
vectors s ∈ Fwqmu is greater or equal to q
w(m+n−w−1)qm(u−1).
Since there are at least qn
2−n full-rank matrices P ∈ Fn×nq ,
the number of possible vectors z in Line 3 of Algorithm 1 is
lower-bounded by
WFz = q
w(m+n−w−1)+m(u−1)+n2−n.
Since u < n ≤ m, this is always larger than the work factor
WFα = q
mu of brute-forcing α and thus, trying all possible z
does not reduce the security of the system.
B. Interleaved Decoding Attack
As described in Section V-B, an attacker can apply an
interleaved decoder on kpub to retrieve an alternative private
key.
The crucial point in the interleaved decoding algorithm is
solving a linear system of equations based on the syndromes
with w + 1 unknowns and ϕ linearly independent equations
which is equivalent to finding the kernel of the matrix in (6),
cf. [22, Section 4.1]. For ζ ≥ wn−k−w , the dimension of
the solution space is one and all solutions are valid for the
remaining decoding steps. For ζ < wn−k−w , the dimension of
the solution space is w + 1 − ϕ but the valid solutions form
only a one-dimensional subspace of the solution space. One
can search in the solution space for a valid solution which
requires on average
(qm)w+1−ϕ
qm
= qm(w−ϕ)
trails.
The size of the solution space is maximized for the smallest-
possible value of ϕ, i.e., ϕ = n− k − w. In this case, search
through the solution space has a work factor of
WFILD = q
m(2w−n+k).
Since the size of the solution space is maximal for ϕ = n −
k−w, the repair from Section VI with the explicit parameter
value ζ = 1 is the most secure choice in this sense. However,
we keep the choice of ζ free for the case that an attack is
found which utilizes the pair-wise linear dependence of the
zi.
Besides the interleaved decoding algorithms in [18], [19],
and [22, p. 64], there is an interpolation-based decoding
algorithm [22, Section 4.3 (page 72)]. This interpolation-
based algorithm can be interpreted both as a list decoder
with exponential worst-case and average list size or as a
probabilistic unique decoder.
It is mentioned in [22, Section 4.3.2] that the probabilistic
unique interpolation-based decoder fails if and only if the
decoding algorithms in [18], [19], [22, p. 64] fail.
In case of the list decoder, there are two known results on
the list size:
• [22, Lemma 4.5] states that the maximal list size of the
decoder (and thus the work factor of the resulting attack)
is at most
WFlist, public key ≤ q
m(u−1)k. (11)
• [22, Lemma 4.6] states that the average list size is rela-
tively small, assuming that the received word is uniformly
distributed at random in Fu×nqm . This assumption is not
satisfied in our case. Since there is a dependency of
decoding failure of the probabilistic unique decoder and
the list size of the list decoder, we conjecture that the
average list size is close to the worst case since the error
is chosen such that unique decoding always fails.
C. (List) Decoding on the Ciphertext Attack
As we have seen in Section IV-A, the ciphertext of the
(repaired) FL system is a codeword of a Gabidulin code,
corrupted by an error of rank weight at most τ = w + tpub.
Hence, an attacker can try to decode the ciphertext directly.
Since τ is always greater than the unique decoding radius⌊
n−k
2
⌋
of the Gabidulin code, this would require the existence
of an efficient (list) decoding algorithm up to radius τ .
However, such an algorithm has not been found, yet. It was
even shown in [6], [7] that for some classes of Gabidulin codes
(of rate ≥ 15 ) such an algorithm cannot exist. Note that the
latter result was not yet known when the FL cryptosystem was
proposed.
For instance, for a Gabidulin code with parameters n | m
and gcd(n, n−τ) ≥ 2, there is a received word such that there
are at least
Lc,worst ≥ max


[
n/g
(n−τ)/g
]
qg
qn(τ/g−1)
: g ≥ 2, g | gcd(n, n− τ)


(12)
codewords in rank distance at most τ to it.
Note that the list size Lc,worst is a lower bound on the worst-
case work factor of the attack. Although it does not imply
any statement about the average list size/average work factor,
it gives us an estimate in which order of magnitude the work
factor of such an attack can be. We ensured that the value
of Lc,worst is sufficiently large in our example parameters in
Section VIII.
On the other hand, it implies that there is no polynomial-
time list decoding algorithm for arbitrary Gabidulin codes
beyond the unique decoding radius (such as the Guruswami–
Sudan algorithm for Reed–Solomon codes). Hence, an efficient
attack can always be counteracted by a suitable parameter
choice.
D. Syndrome Decoding Attack
The ciphertext can be interpreted as a codeword from a code
of dimension k (see [2]), generated by the generator matrix

Mk−u,q (g)
Trqum/qm(γ1kpub)
...
Trqum/qm(γukpub)

 .
Since the structure of this code only permits decoding like a
random rank-metric code, it can be decoded with the syndrome
decoding attack from [26] whose complexity is in the order
of
WFSD = (n− k)
3m3qtpub⌈
(k+1)m
n
⌉−m.
E. Linearization Attack
In [2], a message attack was proposed which succeeds for
some parameters with high probability in polynomial time.
Lemma 9 (Linearization Attack [2]) Let k
(i)
pub =
Trqmu/qm(γikpub) for i = 1, . . . , u and
M =


Mtpub+1,q (c)
−Mtpub+1,q
(
k
(1)
pub
)
...
−Mtpub+1,q
(
k
(u)
pub
)
−Mk+tpub−u,q (g)


. (13)
Then, the encrypted message m can be efficiently recovered if
the left kernel of M has dimension dim(ker(M)) = 1.
If (u + 2)tpub + k > n, then M has at least two more
rows than columns and we have dim(ker(M)) > 1. If kpub is
random and (u + 2)tpub + k ≤ n, the attack is efficient with
high probability [2].
Lemma 10 Let M be as in (13). Then,
rankqm(M) ≤ min{ϕ+ k + 2tpub − u, n}.
Proof: We can write
k
(i)
pub = Trqmu/qm(γikpub)
= Trqmu/qm(γix) ·Mk,q (g) + zi,
so by elementary row operations, we can transform M into
M′ =


Mtpub+1,q (c)
−Mtpub+1,q (z1)
...
−Mtpub+1,q (zu)
−Mk+tpub−u,q (g)

 .
Due to w + 2tpub < n − k, the matrix Mtpub+1,q (zi) is a
sub-matrix of Mn−k−w,q (zi), so
rankqm(M) = rankqm(M
′)
≤ ϕ+ rankqm(Mtpub+1,q (c)) + rankqm(Mk+tpub−u,q (g))
= ϕ+ k + 2tpub − u.
Further, since the number of columns of M is equal to n,
rankqm(M) ≤ n.
The linearization attack is inefficient if the rank of M is
smaller than its number of rows, which implies the following,
stronger version of the original statement in [2].
Theorem 11 If tpub >
n−k
u+2 or ϕ < u(tpub + 1), the
linearization attack in [2] is inefficient and its work factor
is
WFLin = q
m·max{utpub+u+1−ϕ,(u+2)tpub+k+1−n}.
The first condition in Corollary 11 is again fulfilled by the
choice of w in Table I. The second one reads tpub >
ϕ
u + 1,
and for any valid ϕ, there are choices of w such that tpub
fulfills this inequality for any u > 1.
F. Algebraic Attacks
Faure and Loidreau [2] also described two message attacks
of exponential worst-case complexity. The first one is based
on computing gcds of polynomials of degrees
qm(u−1)
qtpub+1 − 1
q − 1
=: WFAlg. (14)
Since computing the gcd of two polynomials can be imple-
mented in quasi-linear time in the polynomials’ degree, (14)
gives an estimate on the work factor of this attack. The
second algebraic attack is based on finding Gröbner bases of
a system of np =
(
n
k+2tpub−u+1
)
many polynomials of degree
approximately dp =
qtpub+1−1
q−1 . The attack is only efficient for
small code parameters, cf. [2, Sec. 5.3]. Since the average-case
complexity of Gröbner bases algorithms is hard to estimate,
we cannot directly relate np and dp to the attack’s work factor.
Faure and Loidreau choose the code parameters such that
np ≈ 2
32 and dp = 127 and claim that the attack is inefficient
for these values. Our example parameters in Section VIII result
in at least these values.
G. Overbeck-like Attack
The key attack described in [3, Ch. 7, Sec. 2.1] is based on
a similar principle as Overbeck uses to attack the McEliece
cryptosystem based on rank-metric codes [9]. The attack from
[3, Ch. 7, Sec. 2.1] cannot be applied if
w ≥ n− k −
k − u
u− 1
.
H. Moving to Another Close Error Attack
The following attack by Rosenkilde [27] tries to move the
vector z (which we have chosen such that the interleaved
decoder fails) on a close vector for which the interleaved
decoder for kpub does not fail. Therefore, a vector y ∈ F
u×n
qm
is needed such that for z′ := z+y it holds that rankq(z
′) ≤ w
and that the rank of the matrix from (6) over Fqm is at least
w.
Rosenkilde suggested to find such a vector by guessing 2w−
n + k independent vectors from Fnq which are in the Fq-row
space of z, put them as the first rows of a matrix in Fum×nq
(the remaining rows are zeros) and use its mapping to a matrix
in Fu×nqm as matrix y. That way, z
′ is in the row space of z and
rankq(z
′) ≤ w is guaranteed. Further, the rank of the matrix
from (6) over Fqm is increased to w with high probability.
The complexity of this attack is dominated by the complex-
ity of finding 2w−n+ k independent vectors from Fnq which
are in the Fq-row space of z, i.e.:
WFMCE = q
(2w−n+k)(n−w).
I. Brute-Force the Parameter α Attack
An attacker can brute-force α, which has a complexity of
WFα = q
mu.
By knowing α, he just needs to apply an efficient decoding
algorithm on c˜ = c− Trqmu/qm(αkpub) to retrieve the secret
message.
VIII. ANALYSIS OF THE REPAIRED SYSTEM
In this section, we recall the conditions on the choice of
the parameters such that all known attacks are inefficient and
summarize their work factors. Furthermore, we give specific
parameters and compare the FL system to other code-based
cryptosystems.
A. Summary of the Work Factors
In the following, we choose the parameters q, m, n, k,
u, w, and tpub as in Table I. Recall that this choice of w
prevents the Overbeck-like attack (Section VII-G) and results
in an exponential work factor of the linearization attack
(Section VII-E). Furthermore, we choose ζ = 1 to maximize
the work factor of searching the exponentially-large output of
the interleaved decoding attack (Section VII-B). Note that the
latter attack returns an exponentially-large output if and only
if of the GOT [10] attack fails, cf. Theorem 7.
The resulting considered work factors are summarized in
Table II. In addition to these work factors, we have considered
the following additional requirements:
• The work factor of the second algebraic attack in [2]
(cf. Section VII-F) is unknown. Hence, we choose the
code parameters such that the resulting non-linear system
of equations occurring in the attack consists of more than
np ≈ 2
32 many polynomials of degree at least dp = 127.
This is the same choice as in [2].
• Since there is no efficient list decoder for Gabidulin
codes, the work factor of the list-decoding ciphertext
attack in Section VII-C is not known. However, we do
have a lower bound on the worst-case work factor for
some codes, given by the maximal list size Lc,worst in (12).
In all examples for which the bound holds, we chose the
parameters such that log2(Lc,worst) is much larger than
the claimed security level.
Table II
SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSEDATTACKS’ WORK FACTORS
Name of the attack Work factor Reference
Brute-force z WFz = qw(m+n−w−1)+m(u−1)+n
2−n Section VII-A
Interleaved Decoding WFILD = q
m(2w−n+k) Section VII-B
Syndrome Decoding WFSD = (n− k)
3m3qtpub⌈
(k+1)m
n
⌉−m Section VII-D, using [26]
Linearization WFLin = q
m·max{utpub+u+1−ϕ,(u+2)tpub+k+1−n} First in [2], cf. Section VII-E
Algebraic WFAlg = q
m(u−1) q
tpub+1−1
q−1
First in [2], cf. Section VII-F
Moving to Another Close Error WFMCE = q
(2w−n+k)(n−w) First in [27], cf. Section VII-H
Brute-force α WFα = qmu Section VII-I
Table III
COMPARISON OF THE MCELIECE (BASED ON GOPPA CODES), THE LOIDREAU, THE REPAIRED FL, THE QC-MDPC AND THE DC-LRPC
CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Method q u k n m w τ tLoi λ Security level Rate Key size
McEliece 2 1436 1876 11 41 80.04 0.77 78.98 KB
Loidreau 2 32 50 50 3 3 80.93 0.64 3.60 KB
Repaired FL 2 3 31 61 61 16 90.00 0.46 1.86 KB
QC-MDPC 2 4801 9602 80.00 0.50 0.60 KB
DC-LRPC 2 37 74 41 80.00 0.50 0.19 KB
McEliece 2 2482 3262 12 66 128.02 0.76 242.00 KB
Loidreau 2 40 64 96 4 3 139.75 0.63 11.52 KB
Repaired FL 2 3 31 62 62 17 131.99 0.45 1.92 KB
QC-MDPC 2 9857 19714 128.00 0.50 1.23 KB
DC-LRPC 2 47 94 47 128.00 0.50 0.30 KB
McEliece 2 5318 7008 13 133 257.47 0.76 1123.43 KB
Loidreau 2 80 120 128 4 5 261.00 0.67 51.20 KB
Repaired FL 2 4 48 83 83 21 256.99 0.53 4.31 KB
QC-MDPC 2 32771 65542 256.00 0.50 4.10 KB
B. Parameters and Key Sizes
To evaluate the performance of the repaired FL cryp-
tosystem, we compare it to McEliece’s cryptosystem based
on Goppa codes using list decoding [28], Loidreau’s new
rank-metric code-based encryption scheme [29], [30], the
QC-MDPC cryptosystem [31] and the DC-LRPC based sys-
tem [32].
The most efficient attack on McEliece has a work factor
(cf. [28]) of
WFME = min
{
1
2
(
n
τ
)(
n− k
τ − p
)−1(
k
p
)−1/2
: 0 ≤ p ≤ min{τ, k}
}
operations, where τ is the binary Johnson bound.
The work factor of Loidreau’s system [29], [30] is
WFLoi = m
3q(tLoi−1)⌊(k·min(m,n))/n⌋,
operations, where tLoi · λ =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
.
In Table III, parameters for expected work factors of around
280, 2128 and 2256 are shown. Further, both the required key
sizes and the achieved rates are given, where the rate states
the ratio of length of the secret message to the length of
the ciphertext. The shown work factors of the repaired FL
system stem from the number of operations required by the
most efficient attack which is the Moving to Another Close
Error Attack for 280 and the Algebraic Attack for 2128 and
2256. We observe that in all cases McEliece has the highest
rate followed by Loidreau, repaired FL, QC-MDPC and DC-
LRPC. The results further show that repaired FL requires much
smaller key sizes compared to Loidreau and McEliece, it has
similar key sizes as QC-MDPC and it is in this sense only
worse compared to the system based on DC-LRPC codes5.
Since public-key cryptosystems are mostly used for encrypting
small data packages (usually they are used to exchange the
private key of a symmetric cryptosystem), small key sizes are
usually more important than high code rates.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, new coding-theoretic interpretations of the
Faure–Loidreau system were given. It was shown that the
ciphertext is a corrupted codeword of a Gabidulin code, where
to an unauthorized receiver, the error weight is too large to be
correctable. The authorized user knows the row space of a part
of the error and is thus able to correct the error.
Further, it was derived that a part of the public key can be
seen as a corrupted codeword of an interleaved Gabidulin code
and that in the original FL system, an interleaved Gabidulin
5Since no parameters for a security level of 256 bit were provided in [32],
Table III doesn’t include the LRPC system for this security level.
decoder can efficiently recover the private key from this part
of the public key with high probability. It was proven that the
condition that interleaved Gabidulin decoders fail is equal to
the condition that the severe attack by Gaborit, Otmani and
Talé Kalachi fails.
Based on the latter interpretation, a repair was proposed that
modifies the key generation algorithm such that interleaved
Gabidulin decoders fail which in turn implies that the attack
by Gaborit et al. fails.
A security analysis was conducted and it was shown that
the security level is not decreased with respect to all other
known attacks by the proposed repair.
Parameters for security levels of 80, 128, 256 bit where
presented and compared to McEliece-like systems based on
Goppa codes, Gabidulin codes, QC-MPDC codes and DC-
LRPC codes. It was observed that the repaired FL system has
smaller key sizes compared the systems based on Goppa codes
and Gabidulin codes, similar key sizes as the system based on
QC-MDPC codes but larger key sizes than DC-LRPC based
system. However, while both the QC-MDPC and DC-LRPC
scheme give no guarantee that the ciphertext can be decrypted
as decoding these codes might fail, the repaired FL system
guarantees decryption. Hence, the repaired FL cryptosystem
has advantages compared to the other mentioned systems and
should be considered as an alternative of small key size.
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